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CHAPTER INTRODUCTION: BIAS IN LITIGATION AND
AMONG THE JUDICIARY
DIANE S. KINGt

Whereas our justice system has long acknowledged our faith in juries as a bedrock of our judicial system, due to the value of the combined
wisdom of people with different backgrounds and beliefs, this concept is
not applied when it comes to judges. Why not? Why do we assume that
judges do not, or should not, bring their experiences to bear on their interpretation of a set of circumstances?
The "Bias in Litigation and Among the Judiciary" panel was composed of Judge Christine Arguello of the United States District Court for
the District of Colorado, Pat Chew, Salmon Chaired Professor and Distinguished Faculty Scholar, University of Pittsburgh School of Law, and
Jason Bent, Assistant Professor of Law, Stetson University College of
Law.
When then-nominee for the United States Supreme Court Judge
Sonia Sotomayor remarked about the "wise Latina judge," this remark
ignited considerable controversy. Some claimed that the nominee could
not possibly be objective or fair, while others claimed that she was just
stating the obvious. Though coming at the issue from very different directions, the articles by Professors Chew and Bent examine the underlying assumptions our system of justice makes as to the role played by the
backgrounds of judges.
Professor Chew's essay, entitled Anticipating the Wise Latina
Judge,' explores how alternative race and gender perspectives bring insight into cases where those perspectives are relevant. By its very title,
Professor Chew captures the nub of the problem. There are those who
argue that any sort of diversity, be it sex, race, or otherwise, predisposes
a judge towards inappropriate bias. Professor Chew explores whether
fears of bias are justified.
Professor Chew compares and contrasts the application of both the
formalist model of decision making and the realist model of decision
making. Under the formalist model, the judicial analytical process is
supposed to be systematic and uniformly executed. Under the realist
model, there is an acknowledgement that judges cannot help but bring
their backgrounds and experiences to the bench.
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As a practical matter, there are differences based upon gender and
race. Professor Chew cites to empirical research exploring how the race
and gender of judges impacts their judicial decision making when race
and gender are salient parts of the case. For example, the likelihood of a
plaintiffs success in a sex discrimination case increases by 10% when
the judge is a woman.
Professor Chew explores whether the fears regarding a "wise Latina" make sense. Her point is that there is irony in the fear of the Latina
judge-why fear the Latina judge and not any other judge? Why not fear
the white male judge who is far less likely to have actually experienced
illegal discrimination? There is no empirical evidence that judges of a
particular gender or race are more likely than any other gender or race to
ignore legal principles and instead substitute their own political or personal preferences.
Professor Chew applies salience theory to explain differences in
perception. Salience theory is the explanation for why, when individuals
are bombarded with information, certain bits of that information stand
out more than other bits of the information. This theory offers explanations as to why judges may have different perspectives when faced with
the same information. Professor Chew concludes that since "individuals
can be trained to find salient stimuli that would otherwise not be noticed," judges should use a "deep" analysis of the factual circumstances
and the applicable legal principles in order to gain awareness of their
potential bias. This "deep" analysis involves a collaborative and introspective process where the decision maker examines the perspective of,
for example, a minority judge's world view in order to understand the
judge's alternative assumptions and saliencies.
Judge Christine Arguello, who spoke on the panel, is herself a wise
Latina, having had a hardscrabble childhood and having been a partner in
several major law firms, a law professor, Managing Senior Associate
University Counsel, and Colorado's Deputy Attorney General prior to
joining the bench. Her talk reinforced the points that Professor Chew
makes. Judge Arguello emphasized that no judge is a blank slate. She
questioned why, given that fact, being a woman and Hispanic would be
perceived as a "problem" instead of an asset. Judge Arguello gave examples where her background influenced her decision making, but for the
better. Those examples emphasized that in certain circumstances, she had
an enhanced understanding and increased sensitivity that lead her to
make more informed decisions. In addition, her background and sensitivity influences her vocabulary; whereas Justice Alito uses the label "illegal alien," to refer to individuals in the country illegally, Judge Arguello
prefers the label "non-citizen." Last, her background has led her to treat
pro se litigants with patience and respect. Judge Arguello's overarching
theme was that bringing a diverse perspective to the bench is an asset,
not a detriment.
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Professor Bent, in his paper Hidden Priors: Toward a Unifying
Theory of Systemic Disparate Treatment Law,2 makes the point that
judges make fundamental assumptions based upon their backgrounds and
beliefs. These fundamental assumptions, or "hidden priors," lie buried
and often hidden beneath layers of legal doctrine and analysis. By way of
example, Professor Bent looks at the Supreme Court's decision in WalMart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes,3 and examines the hidden priors in the decision. He uses the decision to both analyze the impact of the case on disparate-treatment law and to argue that despite the fact that there are
shortcomings in the use of statistical evidence which were exposed by
the Court, that statistical evidence is still important and should be examined in conjunction with the underlying assumptions.
In the Wal-Mart decision, Professor Bent exposes the hidden priors
in Wal-Mart, which are the Court's preconceptions about the background
rates of discrimination. Quoting the Court,
[L]eft to their own devices most managers in any corporation-and
surely most managers in a corporation that forbids sex discrimination-would select sex-neutral, performance-based criteria
for hiring
4
and promotion that produce no actionable disparity at all.
It is telling that Justice Scalia cites to no authority for the above
statement. Based upon this hidden prior, articulated by Justice Scalia, the
majority went on to articulate an entirely new, and more rigorous, standard to be applied in a systemic disparate treatment case-to establish a
prima facie case, the plaintiff must establish both a gross statistical disparity and the identification of a particular policy or mechanism responsible for generating the observed disparity. This new second element can
be satisfied through evidence of a policy of discrimination, a common
discriminating decision maker or anecdotal evidence on a larger scale
than what was produced by the plaintiffs in Wal-Mart.
Professor Bent attributes the Court's doctrinal shift to the fact that
the Court's underlying assumption about the prevalence of discrimination in society has changed from the 1970s, when discrimination was
very prevalent, to now, when at least the Court assumes that discrimination is relatively rare (this point is obviously open to debate). He goes on
to argue that the scholarship on systemic disparate treatment has, thus
far, not articulated the proper role and importance of statistical evidence;
thus, there has been no coherent theory that both advances the goals of
the doctrine, on the one hand, without overstating the reach of statistical
evidence, on the other hand. In his article, Professor Bent proposes a
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theory of systemic disparate treatment that embraces hidden or Bayesian
priors and takes them into account in evaluating claims.

